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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain inputs in the framework of 
possibility theory. This framework is flexible enough to allow for numerical and ordinal 
revision procedures. It is emphasized that revision under uncertain inputs can be 
understood in two different ways, depending on whether the input is viewed as a 
constraint to be enforced, or as an unreliable piece of information. Two revision rules 
are proposed to implement these forms of revision. It is shown that M. A. Williams's 
transmutations, originally defined in the setting of Spohn's functions, can be captured in 
possibility theory, as well as Boutilier' s natural revision. The use of conditioning reatly 
simplifies the description of  these belief change operations. Lastly, preliminary results on 
implementing revision rules at the syntactic level are given. © 1997 Elsevier Science 
Inc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Belief revision in the sense of Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors, and Makinson 
[1] (also called AGM revision) presupposes the existence of a so-called 
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epistemic entrenchment relation which rank-orders the formulas in a 
belief base to be revised [20]. It has been pointed out that this epistemic 
entrenchment is nothing but a qualitative necessity measure and that 
faithful extensions of G~irdenfors's notions of expansion, contraction, and 
revision can be defined in the framework of possibility theory and possi- 
bilistic logic; see [15, 17]. In this setting, belief change can be discussed 
either in terms of a distribution (here a possibility distribution) defined on 
the possible worlds (as in probability theory and in the work of Grove [23]), 
or in terms of a knowledge base in possibilistic logic (made of classical 
propositional formulas weighted by lower bounds of necessity measures) 
from which a possibility distribution can be defined. 
With this view in mind, revising a layered knowledge base by the 
introduction of a new piece of information turns out to be representable 
by an appropriate conditioning of a possibility distribution. This condition- 
ing operation remains in agreement with AGM postulates (after 
Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors, and Makinson) for revision [20]. However, in the 
spirit of conditioning, the input information is taken as a sure fact (with 
maximal level of certainty), while in the spirit of belief revision theory, the 
input should only belong to the revised belief set, possibly at the lower 
level. The latter is called natural revision by Boutilier [5]. Conditions under 
which possibility theory captures natural revision are given. 
In this paper the extension of possibilistic conditioning to uncertain 
inputs is extensively studied, along the lines previously investigated in [16, 
18]. It is pointed out that belief revision with uncertain inputs can be 
expressed in terms of mixtures: convex-sum-product mixtures in the 
probabilistic setting, and max-min or max-product mixtures in the possi- 
bilistic setting [10]. There are two views of what an uncertain input may 
mean. The first view, already implemented in the probabilistic rule due to 
Jeffrey, is to consider that an uncertain input is a constraint that the final 
belief state must satisfy. It acts as a correction of the prior belief state. The 
other view is that of an unreliable input that is liable to be rejected. Two 
possibilistic revision rules are described that implement this distinction. 
It is then shown that natural revision is in some cases equivalent o 
several Jeffrey-like revisions under uncertain inputs in the possibilistic 
setting. Moreover, a possibilistic revision under uncertain inputs is also 
shown to coincide exactly with M. A. Williams's notion of adjustment. 
More generally, a unified view is provided of various approaches developed 
by Boutilier [5], Boutilier and Goldszmidt [6], Williams [32-34], Gold- 
szmidt and Pearl [22], and Darwiche and Pearl [9]. 
These works lay bare two representations of conditioning that can be 
expressed in possibility theory: one (based on the minimum operation) 
which is purely ordinal and is at work in Williams's adjustments, for 
instance, and another (based on the product, thus requiring a richer scale) 
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like Dempster's rule of conditioning, which is equivalent to Spohn condi- 
tioning [31] through a rescaling and is used by Pearl and his coauthors. 
Lastly, it is explained how to revise a possibilistic knowledge base by means 
of an uncertain input without making the underlying possibility distribu- 
tion explicit. We start by briefly recalling how belief change under uncer- 
tain inputs is dealt with in the probabilistic setting. 
2. THE PROBABIL IST IC  SETT ING FOR BEL IEF  REVIS ION 
Bayes's rule of conditioning by a sure event has been understood by 
some researchers as a belief revision operation that, given a prior probabil- 
ity P and a sure input A, yields a posterior probability P' = P(.IA) (see, 
e.g., [20]). In this view, the input A is viewed as a constraint P ' (A)  = 1. It 
has been extended by Jeffrey [24] to the case of uncertain inputs under the 
form of a partition {A1, A 2 . . . . .  A n} of 1), where each event A i is assigned 
probability o~/ (with Ea /= 1 and P'(A~) > 0). The result of the revision is 
then 
P ' (B)  = P(BI{(A i ,  o~/)}i= 1. . . . . .  ) = Y'~ oliP(BlAi). 
i= l , . . . ,n  
(1) 
In the case of a binary partition, i.e., an uncertain input A with probability 
a, it gives 
P(B I (A ,  o~)) = aP(B IA)  + (1 - o~)P(BIX). (2) 
This revision rule (1)-(2) has been justified by P. M. Williams [36] on the 
basis of minimizing the informational distance I (P, P') under the con- 
straints P' (A i) = a i for i = 1 . . . . .  n. Equation (1) can also be justified at 
the formal level by the fact that the only way of combining the conditional 
probabilities P(B[A i) in an eventwise manner (i.e., using the same combi- 
nation law for all events B) so as to recover a probability measure is to use 
a linear weighted combination such as (1) [25]. Note that the uncertain 
input is really viewed as a constraint that forces the probability measure to 
bear certain values on a partition of l-I. The input assigns new probability 
values to prescribed events forming a partition of fI. Jeffrey's rule ensures 
that probabilities do not change in relative value for situations within each 
partition element A i. In the above approach, the coefficient ~i is inter- 
preted as the sure claim that the probability of input Ai is a~, and leads to 
a correction of the prior probability. In particular, it is a genuine revision 
process, since the a priori probability and the input are at the same level; 
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for instance, they are both generic knowledge, or both uncertain pieces of 
evidence. 
However, consider the case where the probability P refers to a popula- 
tion and the input {(Ai, oti)}i= 1 . . . . . .  means that an event has occurred that 
informs about the current situation, and a i is the probability that this 
particular event is A r This situation is one of unreliable input. The input 
is really a piece of uncertain evidence, and (1) then just computes the 
expected value of the conditional probability P(B IA)  where A is a random 
event whose realizations belong to the partition {A 1 . . . . .  An}. This random 
event A is then a genuine unreliable observation, a i being the probability 
that Ai is the true input (and not the true probability of Z i to be enforced 
as in the previous paragraph). So ot i = P" (A  = A i ) .  In other words, the 
coefficients represent a complete  probability assignment P" on the family 
of subsets 2 n, and a i = P" ({A i} )  , while in Jeffrey's rule, {(Ai, Oti)}i= 1 ...... 
is an i ncomplete ly  descr ibed probability measure P '  on 12 and a i = P ' (A i ) .  
When a i = 1, the conditional probability P(B IA  i) represents the result of 
focusing P on the reference class A~, and not the revision of the generic 
knowledge ncoded by P. Focusing on a reference class for the purpose of 
deriving a plausible conclusion pertaining to a case at hand is more in the 
spirit of probabilists uch as De Finetti than in the spirit of probability 
kinematics after Jeffrey. It rfiay look strange that the two views, corre- 
sponding to a revision and an uncertain focusing respectively, coincide in 
their implementation. However, the requirement that {A 1 . . . . .  A n} form a 
partition does not look compulsory when the input is viewed as an 
uncertain (random) observation rather than a constraint on probability 
values (since it must just be a probability assignment on 2a). The partition 
is compulsory only when the uncertain input is a constraint in order to 
ensure that the result verifies the condition P(A i I{ (A i ,  az), i = 1 . . . . .  n}) 
= a i (since Ei :  ~ ...... oL i = 1). The unreliable input (A, a), interpreted as 
"event A has probably been observed (but maybe nothing has been 
observed)," corresponds to the probability assignment {(A, a), (1~, 1 - o~)}, 
and not {(A, a ) , (~  1 - a)} as for Jeffrey's rule. Indeed, P({A}) = a does 
not imply that P({A}) = 1 - a. 
3. THE POSSIBILISTIC SET'FING FOR BELIEF REVISION 
The distinction between unreliable inputs and constraints on the uncer- 
tainty pervading the result of a belief change operation exists regardless of 
the considered representation framework for an agent's belief. The reason 
why it is useful to cast it in the setting of possibility theory is that the latter 
enables belief revision operations to be expressed that are exactly AGM 
revisions, but the terminology of possibility theory is very similar to the 
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one of probability theory. This hybrid nature of possibility theory makes it 
possible to point out the role of conditioning as a particular evision tool, 
and to envisage the question of uncertain inputs in the AGM setting. 
3.1. Basic Notions 
It makes sense to view the possibilistic approach as a slight improvement 
of the pure logical approach to knowledge representation from the point 
of view of expressiveness. Instead of viewing a belief state as a fiat set of 
mutually exclusive situations, one adds a complete partial ordering on top, 
according to which some situations are considered as more plausible than 
others. A cognitive state can then be modeled by a possibility distribution 
~r, that is, a mapping from l~ to a totally ordered set V containing a 
greatest element (denoted 1) and a least element (denoted 0)--typically 
the unit interval V = [0, 1], but any finite, or infinite and bounded, chain 
will do as well. The advantage of using the plausibility scale V is that it 
makes it easier to compare cognitive states. The idea of representing a 
cognitive state via a plausibility ordering on a set of situations ("possible 
worlds") is also developed by Grove [23] and systematically used by 
Boutilier in his works (e.g., [5]), although he uses the language of modal 
logic. 
Similarly to the probabilistic ase, a possibility distribution generates a 
set function H, called a possibility measure [37], defined by (for simplicity 
V = [0, 1]) 
I I (A)  = maxTr(to) (3) 
togA 
and satisfying II(A u B) = max(II(A), II(B)) as a basic axiom. Except if 
the contrary is explicitly stated, ~r will be supposed to be normalized, i.e., 
3to0, ~'(to0) = 1 (to o is not necessarily unique). The degree of certainty of 
A is measured by means of the dual necessity function N(A) = 1 - II(A). 
Moreover, if f~ is the set of interpretations of a propositional language .~, 
let us denote by [p] the set of models of a proposition p ~_~. Then any 
possibility distribution 7r leads to a belief set K = {p : N([p]) > 0} i.e., a 
deductively closed set of logical formulas, where p E K means that p is 
accepted by the agent holding a cognitive state described by 7r. The models 
of K form the core of ~r, C(~-) = {to : 7r(to) = 1}, since p ~ K iff N([p]) 
> 0 iff [p] contains C(~). However, K can also be viewed as a completely 
preordered belief set according to the levels N([p]). If N( [p] )= 1, it 
means that p will never be questioned. In Giirdenfors's theory only 
tautologies are of that kind. In possibility theory, other formulas can be 
protected in this way. Apart from this point of divergence, the ordering of 
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K so obtained is an epistemic entrenchment ordering in the sense of 
Giirdenfors [15]. 
3.2. Revision and Conditioning 
Revision with a sure input in possibility theory is performed by means of 
a conditioning device similar to the probabilistic one. A conditional possi- 
bility is a distinguished solution to an equation of the form [8] 
VB, I I (A n B) = I I (BIA)* I I (A)  (4) 
that is similar to Bayesian conditioning, together with N(B[A)= 1 -  
II(B[ A). Possible choices for * are min and the product (the latter makes 
sense only in the numerical settings). For * = min this equation may have 
more than one solution II(B[A). The least-specific solution to (4) is 
chosen [i.e., the solution with the greatest possibility degrees in agreement 
with the constraint (4)]. This choice follows a minimal-commitment princi- 
ple specifying that every situation remains possible unless explicitly ruled 
out. The possibility distribution underlying the conditional possibility mea- 
sure II(-[A) is defined by [13] 
10 if 7r(w) = I I (A)  > 0, o J~A,  
1r(wlA) = if o~A,  (5) 
~'(w) if ~-(w) < I I (A) ,  o~ ~A.  
Then II(B[A) = II(A N B) if I I(A n B) < I-I(A), and H(BIA) = 1 if 
I I (A NB)=I I (A )>0.  If H(A)=0,  then ~( . [A)=0,  that is, a fully 
inconsistent possibility distribution results. In this approach, conditioning 
on an impossible event results in destroying zr. This is a matter of 
convention: Alternatively we might define 1r(.[A) = 1 if I I(A) = 0, that is, 
the noninformed possibility distribution is obtained. Note that the exis- 
tence of situations w such that ~-(w) = I I(A) is no longer guaranteed in 
the infinite case, and is generally added as an extra condition to the 
possibility distribution; it is referred to in the literature in terms of 
well-ranked orderings, and leads to adding specific postulates for revision 
[32]. Moreover, considering the belief set K induced by zr, and A = [q] 
for some input formula q, it is not difficult to check that the revised belief 
set K~" induced by 7r(w[A) is Kq = {p: N([p]IA) > 0}. The set of models 
* is { w ~ A" ~-(w) = II(A)}, which proves that possibilistic ondition- of Kq
ing is fully coherent with an AGM revision when I I(A) > 0. Indeed, Kq 
can also be defined as {p:N(~q vp)  > N(-~ q)}. Note that if I I (A) = 1, 
then ~r(.IA) = min(~r, P'A), where /z A is the characteristic function of A. It 
corresponds to the idea of an expansion, for then Kq is the set of 
consequences of K U {q} [17]. 
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The above discussion of conditional possibility, using * = min, makes 
sense in a purely qualitative setting. In a quantitative setting, * = product 
may sound more reasonable, and then the expression corresponding to (4) 
is 
I I (A N B) 
VB, H(BIA) - (6) 
I I (A) 
provided that II(A) ~ 0. This is formally Dempster's rule of conditioning, 
specialized to possibility measures, i.e., consonant plausibility measures in 
the sense of Shafer. The corresponding revised possibility distribution is 
~r(,o) 
"rr(wlA) Vw ~A;  ~'(oJIA) = 0 otherwise. (7) 
Iq(A) 
Note that for both forms of conditioning, N(A) = 1 ~ 7r(-lA) = 7r (no 
revision takes place when the input information is already known with 
certainty). 
The idea of AGM-style revision is to reach a consistent cognitive state 
even if the input information contradicts the a priori cognitive state 
described by a belief set. Possibilistic conditioning verifies the following 
counterparts of the AGM axioms of belief revision [17], letting 7r* denote 
a possibility distribution obtained by revising 7r with input A according to 
the AGM postulates: 
(H~') for any subset A c f~, ~rA* represents a cognitive state (stability); 
(II~') Nf(A)  = 1 (priority to the new information); 
(H~') ~rA* > min(Tr,/z A) (revising does not give more specific results 
than expanding); 
(II~') if H(A) = 1 then 7r* < min(~-, iz A) (if A is not rejected by ~-, 
revision reduces to expansion); 
(H*) ~'A* = 0 if and only if I I(A) = 0; 
(II~') A =B = 7rA* = 7r~; 
(II~') 7rA*n e >_ min(Tr~, /XB); 
( I I*) if I](BIA) = 1 then ~'~nB < min(TrA*, /ZB). 
It makes sense to consider possibilistic conditioning as an AGM-like 
revision and let 7rA* = 7r('lA) with any of the two definitions of condition- 
ing. Note that if A and B are not disjoint, it can be verified that 
7r(-(-[A)IB) = ~r(-IA N B) when iterating the revisions. However, if A N 
B = 0,  then 7r('('IA)iB) is the absurd possibility distribution. 
Moreover, the qualitative conditioning (5) embodies a principle of 
minimal change in the sense of the Hamming distance between 7r and 7r' 
defined by H(~-,Tr')= Z,o~nler(w)-  ~"(oJ)l (f~ finite). It makes sense 
for a finite totally ordered possibility scale V, just mapping the levels to 
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integers. It has been proved that H(Tr; 7r('lA)) is minimal under the 
constraint N(AIA)= 1 as long as there is a single situation oJ A where 
~-(o~ A) = H(A) [17]. When there is more than one situation ~o where 
7r(oJ) = II(A), the principle of minimal change leads to several revision 
functions by selecting one situation w A where ~-(o~ A) = II(A) and letting 
~-ff(o~ A) = 1 and zr](w A) = H(A) for other most possible situations in A 
(this is possibilistic onditioning following Ramer [28]). In that case ~-(-IA) 
is the disjunction of these minimal-change r visions. A minimal-change 
information-theoretic justification for the numerical, product-based condi- 
tioning rule could be envisaged in terms of preserving relative levels of 
plausibility. 
3.3. Boutilier's Natural Revision and Possibility Theory 
However, there is a difference between conditioning and revision in the 
AGM style, in the scope of revising the plausibility ordering that guides 
the revision. Let ~- be a possibility distribution on a set of interpretations, 
and K be the belief set generated by ~- in the corresponding propositional 
language. Since p ~ K corresponds to N([p]) > 0, the success postulate 
q ~ Kq should only require that Nq*([q]) > 0, while N(AIA) = 1 holds 
for the conditioning, in accordance with conditional probability [P(AIA) 
= 1]. So axiom (II~) sounds like a very strong translation of the AGM 
success postulate. Following Boutilier [5], we can consider that the success 
postulate is better expressed in terms of a revised necessity measure NA* 
by N~(A)> 0; this is called natural revision by Boutilier. A natural 
revision by input A only comes down to assigning to the most plausible 
situations in A a degree of possibility higher than to other situations [this 
is enough to ensure that N~(A) > 0] while retaining the same ordering of 
situations as before revision, including for situations outside A. It implies 
that, after revision, some situations where A is not true may remain more 
plausible than situations where A is true. This feature does not fit the idea 
of revision via conditioning, whereby, in the revised state, situations where 
the input information is false are deemed impossible (as is the case with 
probabilistic revision). A natural revision obeys the principle of minimal 
change, since only the set of most plausible worlds in A are moved to 
become the overall most plausible states. 
To describe this elementary change in possibilistic terms requires the 
use of nonnormalized possibility distributions. Indeed, if l-I(il) > H(A), 
then lq(A) = 1 holds if the associated possibility distribution ~- is normal- 
ized. Besides, it must be the case that II~(X) = II(/T) (since the levels of 
possibility of A--worlds remain unchanged) while II~(A) > HI(X)  = 1. 
This is not allowed by the usual conventions of possibility theory. Describ- 
ing this type of change in possibility theory becomes easy if the possibility 
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scale is not upper-bounded. Otherwise, it would require a "denormaliza- 
tion" of the possibility distribution 7r by shifting all possibility levels down 
(while preserving the ordering of interpretations), followed by a shift of all 
best A-worlds up to 1, so that the latter step would be meaningful. One 
way of implementing this method on the unit interval, with 7r normalized, 
is as follows: 
1 
7r(~o) = 1 
~;( ,o )  = ~(o~) 
A, 
if oJ~ {o J~A:z r (o J )  = I I (A )}and 
C(~)  n A = Q, 
if o J~C(~)  AA v~O, 
if ~o ~ C(~-) and 
oJ ~ {~o e A : ~-(o~) = H(A)} if C(rr) n A = O, 
if ~o ~ A n COt),  
where 1 - N(C(Tr)) < A < 1.1 
(8) 
There are three situations: 
1. A contains C(*r). Then N(A)  > 0, and A is believed a priori. Then 
~,TA C(Tr) -- O and *rA*(0J) = 7r(oJ). No change occurs. Natural revi- 
sion does not affect the possibility distribution at all, while condition- 
ing leads to a nontrivial expansion, generally [since *r('lA) :# 7r]. 
2. A n C(Tr)= ~5. Then all the most plausible situations in A are 
moved up to 1 and all other most plausible situations are moved 
down to plausibility A. 
3. _/TA C(Tr) 4: Q and A n C(Tr) ~: QS. Then N(A)  = N(A) = 0, and 
the natural revision comes down to a nontrivial expansion of the 
belief set K. It affects the possibility distribution 7r just by moving 
the A-worlds in C(7r) to the next possibility level down, that is, (8) 
becomes 
zr(w) if oJ ~ C(Tr) or oJ ~ C(~-) NA,  
7r~(oJ) = A, where l -N(C(Tr ) )<A<I I (A)= l ,  (9) 
otherwise. 
The study of revision operators in the setting of possibility theory, 
whether conditioning or natural revisions, points out that while the AGM 
theory gives a recipe for revising belief sets, possibilistic revision opera- 
tions also revise the epistemic ordering of situations. Clearly, iterated 
revision then becomes possible, as also pointed out by Williams [33]. A 
notable property of natural revisions is that (~'A*)] remains nontrivial even 
i fAnB=O.  
1Note that A exists, since f~ is finite, so that N(C('rr)) > O. 
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The difference between conditioning and natural revision actually comes 
down to a difference in interpreting the input information. The possibility 
distribution ~- describes the normal course of things, pointing out the most 
usual situations, and the belief set selects the accepted efault proposi- 
tions, those which are true in all the usual situations. Conditioning by A 
means either (i) that A is a piece of evidence about a case under study, 
and eliminating A-worlds corresponds to focusing on a proper reference 
class, for the purpose of drawing plausible conclusions about the case at 
hand, or (ii) drastically revising the possibility distribution by a piece of 
generic knowledge stating that X-worlds do not exist, that A should be 
fully certain in the revised belief set. There is the same ambiguity as in 
probability theory regarding Bayes conditioning. Natural revision by A 
means a revision of the generic knowledge by addition of a new constraint 
stating that '<it is usual that A," resulting in accepting A. The latter is in 
the spirit of Jeffrey's rule, and the input A is then viewed as a constraint 
on the uncertainty of A after the belief change. Then natural revision is a 
matter of handling uncertain inputs in a possibilistic setting. 
3.4. Contraction 
The contraction of a possibility distribution with respect to A _c 1~ 
corresponds to forgetting that A is believed if A was previously in the 
belief set [N(A) > 0 ~ I I(A) = 1 > FI(A)]. In such a case, the result 
~'A of the contraction must lead to a possibility measure H A such that 
HA(A) = HA(A)= 1, i.e., complete ignorance about A. Intuitively, if 
H(A) = I- I (A)= 1 already, then we should have 7r)= 7r. Besides, if 
FI(A) = 1 > 1-I(A), then we should have ~'A(W) = 1 for some oJ in A, and 
in particular for those o~ such that H(A) = ~-(o~). If H(A) = 1 > II(A), 
i.e., A represents an accepted belief, 7r will be unchanged. That leads 
to [17] 
= [1 if 7 r (o J )= I ] (A) ,  o J~A,  (10) ~'A (o,) 
t 7r(w) otherwise. 
By construction, 7r~ again corresponds to the idea of minimally changing 
7r so as to forget A, when there is a unique ~o ~ A such that 1 > II(A) = 
7r(w). When there are several elements in {oJ ~ A : ~-(o~) = II(A)}, mini- 
mal-change contractions correspond to letting 7r~(o~) = 1 for any selection 
of such situation, and ~'A corresponds to considering the envelope of the 
minimal-change solutions. If I I (A) = 0, what is obtained is the full meet 
contraction [20]. This contraction coincides exactly with a natural contrac- 
tion in the sense of Boutilier and Goldzsmidt [6]. 
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In the classical case, Levi's and Harper's identities [20] respectively 
define the revision by A as first a contraction forgetting ,~ and then an 
expansion adding A, and the contraction by A as retaining the beliefs 
accepted both in the cognitive state ~- and its revision by .~ These results 
remain valid in the possibilistic setting, namely [17], 
+ 
Ir(' lA) = (IRA-) A = min(/~A, ~'A), ~r A = max(It, ~'(-IX)). 
The left-hand identity can also be recovered by changing conditioning into 
natural revision (8), provided that expansion is (9), that is, without elimi- 
nating the A-worlds. In the right-hand identity natural revision (8) can be 
substituted for conditioning as well. An alternative contraction rule to (10) 
is 
7r(o~) 
if o J~X,  
~'A(~o) = I I (X)  
~- (oJ) otherwise, 
that is, the companion to the numerical Bayesian-like possibilistic revision 
rule. Again Levi's and Harper's identities hold between the two Bayesian- 
like rules of conditioning and contraction. 
4. UNCERTAIN INPUTS 
In the following we shall consider a possibilistic ognitive state ~ and 
some uncertain input information of the form (A, a), where a is a degree 
of necessity. The input is modeled ifferently according as it is a constraint 
or an unreliable input. 
4.1. Uncertain Inputs as Constraints 
In this case, the uncertain input (A, a )  forces the revised cognitive state 
It' to satisfy N'(A) = a [i.e., I I ' (A) = 1 and I I '(A) = 1 - a], and the 
following belief change rule is in the spirit of Jeffrey's rule and respects 
these constraints: 
zr(o)l(A, o~)) = max(zr(~olA),(1 - a )*  zr(~olX)), (11) 
where * = min or product according as ~-(~olA) is the ordinal or the 
Bayesian-like revised possibility distribution. To see why, notice that it 
achieves two changes in parallel: a revision (conditioning) on A and 
another one on A. Then the distribution on X is denormalized so as to 
satisfy I I '(A) = 1 - a for ~-' = Ir(.l(A, a)). When * = product, all plau- 
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sibility levels are proportionally shifted down, while only the greatest ones 
are decreased using min. The most plausible worlds in A become fully 
plausible, the most plausible situations in A are forced to level 1 - a, and 
when * = min, all situations that were originally more plausible than 
1 - a, if any, are forced to level 1 - a as well. This operation minimizes 
changes of the possibility levels of situations so as to accommodate the 
constraint N' (A)  = a. Moreover, firmly entrenched beliefs are left un- 
touched: 
LEMMA ] I f  * = min then N ' (B)  = min(N(B iA) ,  max(a,  N(BIA)) .  
Proof Just use the definition of necessity and the equation (11). • 
LEMMA 2 I f  * = rain and N(B)  > max(N(A),  N(A))  then N(B)  = 
min(N(BlA) ,  N(BI A)). 
Proof Using the duality between N and 1-I, and the max decomposition 
of II, it can be checked that N(B)  > max(N(A),  N(iT)) is equivalent o 
1-I(B) < min( I I (A ) ,  I I ( tT))  
max( I I (A  n B), I I (A  n B)) 
< min(max( I I (A  n B), I I (A  n B) ) ,max(H( i ] -n  B), I I (A  n B))) .  
Letting x -= I I (A N B), y = I I (AN B), z = I-I(A n B), and t = I I ( i ln  
B), this reads 
z < max(x, z), 
z < max(y,  t), 
t < max(x, z), 
t < max(y,  t), 
which is equivalent o 
which means 
and 
x > max(z,  t), 
y > max(z,  t), 
I I (A  n B) > max( l l (A  n B),  I I (A  n B)) 
I I (An  B) > max( I I (A  n B) , I I (A  nB) ) .  
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Hence H(B IA)  = I I (A  n B) < I I (A  N B) = I I (A )  and I I (B IA)  = 
H(A  n B) < I I (AN B) = II(A--). Hence 
N(B)  = min(N(A  U B),  N( f fU  B))  = 1 - max(I- l(A n B),  I I (A  n B))  
= 1 - max( I I (B IA) ,  1-I(BIA)) = min(N(B lA) ,  N(BIA--)). 
Note that for * = product, this result does not hold, because, generally, 
one of  the equalities I I (B IA)  = H(A  n B) and I I (B IA)  = I I (A  n B) 
does not hold due to the proport ional renormalization on A or its 
complement. Lemma 2 holds in this case only if N(A)  = N(A)  = O. • 
PROPOSITION 1 I f  * = min and if an event B is such that N(B)  > 
max(N(A) ,  N(A) ,  a),  then N ' (B)  = N(BI (A,  a)) = N(B).  
Proof  Note that N' (B)  = min(N(B IA) ,max(a ,  N(BI-~))), using 
Lemma 1. Using Lemma 2, if N(B)  = N(B IA)  < N(BIA) ,  we find N' (B)  
= min(N(B) ,  max(a ,  N(BIA--))) = N(B) ,  and if N(B)  = N(B IA)  < 
N(BIA) ,  we find N' (B)= min(N(B IA) ,max(a ,N(B) ) )= N(B)  again if 
N(B)  > a. • 
When a = 1, we have ~(~[ (A ,  a) )  = ~-(~[A), that is, the revision by 
conditioning is obtained; but when a = 0, we obtain a possibility distribu- 
tion less specific than zr, such that N(A)  = N(A)  = O, which is a kind of 
contraction different from an AGM contraction in the sense of (10), and 
more drastic. Indeed with (11) the uncertain input (A,  0) is interpreted as 
enforcing total ignorance on A, while contracting_A in the AGM sense 
leaves untouched a cognitive state that believes A, as can be checked on 
(10). When a > 0 and * = min, the possibilistic Jeffrey-like rule exactly 
coincides with what Williams [33] calls an "adjustment" (see Section 4.2 
below). 
The rule (9) can be extended to a set of  input constraints I I (A  i) = hi, 
i = 1 . . . . .  n, where {Ai : i  = 1 . . . . .  n} forms a partition of ~ such that 
maxi= 1 ...... h i = 1 (normalization). It gives the following form of the 
Jeffrey-like rule where * = min or product, whether ~-(~o[A i) is ordinal or 
numerical: 
"rr(to[{(Ai, Ai)}) = maxA i * 7r(to[Ai). (12) 
i 
These qualitative counterparts of convex mixtures were introduced by 
Dubois and Prade [14]. They also underlie qualitative decision theory [19, 
10]. 
The belief revision rule (11)-(12) for * = product has been proposed in 
a quite different form by Spohn [31], using an ordinal conditional function 
K valued on the set ~ of natural integers. An ordinal conditional function 
is defined from a set of  integers {K(to): ~o ~ f~} and is a set function such 
that VA c fL  K(A) = min{K(tO) [ to ~A}.  Here K(to) can be viewed as a 
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degree of impossibility of w. Letting H~(A) = 1 - N~(.4) = 2 -K(A), it is 
easy to check that %(w) is equal to 2 -K(~), where % is the possibility 
distribution associated with II K. Spohn [31] defines two conditioning 
concepts: 
• VoJ c A,  x (o J IA )  = K(w)  - K (A) ;  
• the (A, n)-conditionalization f K [conditioning by an uncertain input 
K'(A) = n]: 
/ K(oglA) if o JcA ,  
K(w[(A,n))  = ~n + K(oJl~zT) if o~ cX ,  
whose possibilistic counterparts are Equations (7), and (11) with 
* = product: 




zr,,(wl(A,n)) = [(1 - a ) - -  ~-,.(.,) 
IL(A) 
if oJ cA ,  
if w ~A,  
(14) 
with ot = 1 - 2 - " .  
The counterpart of (11) can be extended to an input ordinal conditional 
function K' defined on the partition {A 1 . . . . .  A,}: K(wIK') = K'(A i) + 
K(oJIAi) Vw c Ai, i = 1 . . . . .  n. This rule can be exactly mapped to the 
possibilistic belief change rule (12) where * = product and A i = 2 K'(A0. 
4.2 .  Unre l iab le  Inputs  
If (A, a)  is viewed as an unreliable input, it means that a is the degree 
of certainty that A is the actual input supplied by the external source; but 
maybe the source does not work properly, and then no input is considered. 
The unreliable input is then represented by the weighted nested pairs of 
subsets F = {(A ,1) , (~, I -  a)}, where the weights denote degrees of 
possibility. The revised cognitive state ~(-IF) is defined by a possibilistic 
mixture as 
7r(oglF) = max(Tr(o~lA), 7r(o~) *(1 - a) ) .  (15) 
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It means that 7r(-IA) obtains with possibility 1, and ~r is kept with 
possibility 1 - o~. It can be viewed as a possibilistic onditioning eneral- 
ized to the fuzzy event F. 
Computing the effect of unreliable inputs as in (15) is questionable. One 
might wish to keep the result nondeterministic until the source is checked. 
Note the difference with (11): there is no conditioning on ~T[Tr(w)= 
~-(wl~)]. However, contrary to (11), the equality N(A IF )= a is not 
warranted, since, with (15), N(A IF )= min(N(A IA) ,max(N(A) ,a ) )= 
N(A)  whenever N(A)  > a. Lastly, 7r(tolF) = 7r(w) if a = 0, since then 
F = l-l: no revision takes place. This behavior is very different from the 
case when the uncertain input is taken as a constraint. (15) can be formally 
generalized to any fuzzy input F, viewed as a weighted collection of nested 
sets [16]. 
4.3. Adjustments 
Williams [33] has defined a general form of belief change she calls 
transmutations, in the setting of Spohn's functions. Given an uncertain 
input (A, n) taken as a constraint and a Spohn function K describing the 
agent's a priori cognitive state, a transmutation of K by (A, n) produces a 
Spohn function K' such that K'(~xT) = n and K'(A) = 0, i.e., the degree of 
acceptance of A is enforced to level n. Clearly, this notion makes sense in 
the possibilistic setting, where a transmutation of a cognitive state ~r into 
7r' using input N' (A)= a corresponds to enforcing N' (A)= a and 
N'(A)  = 0. Williams [32] has introduced an elementary and qualitative 
type of transmutation called an adjustment. An adjustment of K by (A, n) 
is either a contraction K A if n = 0 or another belief change operation, 
defined as follows: 
K A if n = 0, 
>( 
K~A,n ) = (KA)(A,n)  if 0 < n < K(A), 
K × (A, n) otherwise, 
where 
KA(W)= (0  if w~Xand K(W)=K(A) ,  
K (W) otherwise, 
0 if to ~A and K(oa) = K(A),  
K×CA,,)(~°) = K(W) if either o~ ~ A and K(w) 4: K(A) 
oro~Xand K(~o) >n,  
n otherwise. 
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In order to clarify the meaning of this intricate definition of adjustment, 
let us map it to the possibilistic setting using the transformation pointed 
out in Section 4.1 (with (Y = 1 - 2-“) when IZ # 0. It can be shown (see 
Appendix) that the result of this translation is precisely 
5-TA,u)(w) = max(77(wlA),min(l - LY, r(wlAY))); 
we recognize (11) for (Y > 0. This result leads us to simplify the formula- 
tion of Williams’s adjustment as follows: 
where 
Key,., = min(K*(mIA),max(n, K*(wI~)), (16) 
1 
+a if wEA, 
K*(WIA) = K(O) if K(W) > K(A), 
0 if K(W) = K(A). 
K*( WI A) is the Spohnian version of the qualitative form of possibilistic 
conditioning. Turning K*(wIA) into KCWIA) = K(W) - K(A) when 0 E A 
and max into sum, one gets the Spohnian (A, n)-conditioning rule. Note 
that when n = 0, the rule (16) gives a more drastic contraction, since both 
A and its complement are erased from the belief state. K:~,~, as per (16) 
does not recover the contraction K;, exactly for the same reason as with 
its possibilistic counterpart (11). It seems somewhat artificial to enforce 
* = - when II = 0, as done by Williams [33] on the basis of (16) or 
~$~~e~uestion is whether an input datum of the form (A, 0) is or is not 
equivalent to the pair of constraints {(A, 01, (_&ON. If it is not, then the 
result of the input (A, 0) should indeed be a contraction. In the rule (11) 
the input {(A, a)) is taken as {(A, a), (A, O>} when CY > 0 (and this is also 
true for adjustments). So this interpretation remains when LY = 0. 
4.4. Natural Revision as Revision by an Uncertain Input 
In the case of Boutilier’s [5] natural revision, the enforced input can be 
modeled as N'(A) > 0. It might be tempting to interpret it as a disjunctive 
input “LV’( A) = 1 or N’(A) = a, or _ . . or N'(A) = CQ" with scale V 
made of n + 1 levels A, = 1 > A, > ... > h, > 0, and (Y~ = 1 - A;. This 
suggests that the natural revision might be expressed by using a series of 
adjustments m( wl( A, ai>) and forming their disjunction: 
7-r;(w) = max 
i=2,...,n+l 
&&A, ai)) 
= max(,( wJA),h2 *n(co/~),...,A, *n-(wIx)) 
= max(n(wlA),(l - a!*)* m(oIA)). 
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For * = product, this rule is found in [9] under the name R-conditioning. 
It coincides indeed with natural revision provided that * = min, that 
N(A)  = 0, and that no situation to ~ ,4  has a priori plausibility level 
• r(to) = A2_so that when N(A)  > 0, i.e., I I (A )  < 1 and H(,4) = 1, we 
have I I~(A)  = A 2 > ~-(to) for all to such that 7r(to) < 1. Then natural 
revision comes down to raising the plausibility of  the most plausible 
situations in A to 1 and forcing the most plausible situations in Adown to 
A 2 if they had plausibility 1 previously. I f  7r(to) = A 2 for situations to ~ ,~  
it is always possible to let II~(.,T) = A' where 1 > A' > A 2 if V is infinite 
(= [0, 1]). This gives the adjustment rule (11) for a = 1 - A'. 
PROPOSITION 2 When * = min, the natural revision (8) is equivalent to 
the adjustment rule (11) with input (A, a) where 0 < ct < min{N(B) ] 
B : N(B) > 0} if and only i fN(A)  = O. 
Proof  Note that 0 < a < min{N(B) IB :N(B)  > 0} implies max{~-(to') 
[to' C C(~r)} < 1 - ot < 1; moreover,  N(A)  = 0 means that A does not 
contain C(~-). 
Assume to C C(Tr) U {to ~ A : ,r(to) = H(A)}. Then 7r(tolA) = ~-(to) if 
to ~ A, and ~r(tolA) = 0 otherwise; and 7r(tolA) = 7r(to) if to C A, 7r(to) 
4= H(A) ;  7r(tolA) = 1 if to C A, ~r(to) = H(A-); and 7r(tolA) = 0 other- 
wise. So 
if to cA ,  then zr(to[ (A,  ol)) = max(Tr(to),min(1 - a ,0) )  = 7r(to); 
if to C A, 7r(to) # H(A) ,  then ~-(to [ (A,  a) )  = max(0, min(1 - 
cz, ,r(to))) = ,r(to), since ~'(to) < max{,r(to') I to' C C(~')} < 1 - a;  
if to CA ,  7r(to) = I I (A) ,  then 7r(to I (A,  ol)) = max(0, min(1 - a,  1)) = 
1 - -  O/. 
Assume to ~Xn C(~-) ~: Q. Then ~-(tolA) = 0 and zr(tolA) = 1. 
Hence 7r(to I (A,  ol)) = 1 - a. 
Assume to ~ A and ~-(to) = I I (A) .  Then ~r(tolA) = 1 and ~-(tolX) = 
0. So 7r(to I (A,  ~)) = max(1,min(1 - cz,0)) = 1. 
Note that there is only one case when (8) and (11) give distinct 
possibility distributions: that is when A contains C(~-). Then zr(to[ 
(A,  a) )  = 1 - ~ > ~r(to) for all to CA ,  with 7r(to) = I I (A) .  But this 
case is ruled out if and only if N(A)  = O. • 
When N(A)  > 0, this is the case of  trivial expansion for which 7rf --- 7r, 
and 7r(to l (A,  a ) )= 7r(to) except for to CA,  and 7r ( to)= H(A) .  Those 
elements are just moved up without reaching 1. Hence the ordering of 
situations is generally modified, since there may exist elements to1 ~ A 
and to2 CA such that ~'(tol) = 7r(to2) = H(A)  < 1, and then 7r(tol] 
(A,  a ) )= ~ ' ( to l )<  ~'(to2 [(A,  a ) )= 1 - a. So some elements of -~be-  
come more plausible for the sake of letting N'(A)  be positive but as small 
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as possible. This is a kind of contraction by A, while revising 7r by 
N' (A)  > 0 when N(A)  > 0 should leave the cognitive state as it was. This 
is because the disjunctive input "N ' (A)= 1 or N' (A)= a n or . . .o r  
N' (A)  = a2" (with c~ 2 = c~) that expresses N' (A)  > 0 is interpreted as 
N' (A)  = a by the adjustment rule--that is, as being the weakest state- 
ment among them. But N' (A)  = a is informationally stronger than N' (A)  
> 0, since the set of possibility distributions that satisfy the former is a 
proper subset of the set of possibility distributions that satisfy the latter. 
The adjustment rule is a simple means of forcing the plausibility of some 
situations to a prescribed level, while natural revision no longer forces 
anything when the input information is already accepted to any level. 
5. SYNTACTIC REVISIONS OF POSSIBILISTIC BELIEF BASES 
Revision tools presented at the semantic level in the previous sections 
cannot be applied to knowledge bases right away. They should first be 
expressed at the syntactic level. In this section we consider layered knowl- 
edge bases made of weighted propositional formulas in possibilistic logic 
[12]. This question has also been addressed by Williams [34, 35] in an 
integer-valued setting and the terminology of epistemic entrenchments 
[201. 
5.I. Possibilistic Logic 
The syntax of possibilistic logic consists of sentences in the first-order 
calculus to which are attached lower bounds on the degree of necessity (or 
possibility) of these sentences. In this section, degrees of uncertainty 
belong to a totally ordered set V with bottom 0 and top 1. Here we 
consider only the fragment of possibilistic logic with propositional sen- 
tences to which lower bounds of degrees of necessity are attached. If p is a 
propositional sentence, (p a)  is the syntactic ounterpart of the semantic 
constraint N([p]) > a, where [p] denotes the set of models of p. 
A possibilistic belief base is a finite set ~ = {(Pi a i ) : i  = 1 . . . . .  m} of 
weighted (propositional) formulas that contain beliefs explicitly held by an 
agent. The weight indicates the agent's confidence in the corresponding 
formula. Note that any belief base ~ (i.e., set of propositional sentences) 
equipped with a complete partial ordering > can be mapped to a 
possibilistic belief base, changing p and q in ~'  into (p a)  and (q/3) such 
that a > /3 if and only if p > q. As already pointed out, the unit interval 
could be changed into any bounded, totally ordered set; the possibility- 
necessity duality is then expressed by reversing the ordering. 
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Reasoning in possibilistic logic is done by means of an extension of the 
resolution principle to weighted clauses: 
(c a ) ;  (c ' /3)  t- (Res(c, c') min(~,  f l)),  
where c and c' are propositional clauses, and Res(c, c') is their resolvent. 
For instance, (7  p v q a); (p  v r f l )  I- (q v r rain(a,/3)). This inference 
rule presupposes that when, in a possibilistic formula (p  a), p is not in 
clausal form, it can be turned into a set {(c i c~), i = 1 . . . . .  n} of weighted 
clauses such that p is equivalent o c 1 m c 2 A ... A c n. This is justified by 
the semantics of propositional logic, and by the fact that N(p)  > a is 
equivalent o N(c i) > a for i = 1 . . . . .  n [from now on, we write N(p)  
instead of N([p]) for short]. Inference from a possibilistic belief base is 
denoted .Z( t- (p  a),  and is short for ~ U {(~ p 1)} t- (1  a )  (refutation 
method). ~t -  (3_ ct) can be checked by means of repeated use of the 
resolution principle until the empty clause is attained, with some positive 
weight. The degree of inconsistency inc(.Yf) is then defined by max{a I ~ F- 
(± ~)}. 
The set of situations in which a possibilistic logic sentence (p  ~) is true 
is a fuzzy set [p or] on ~ defined by 
1 if o J~[p] ,  
/Z[PaI(tO) = 1 - a otherwise; 
/ztp~] is the least specific (i.e., the greatest) possibility distribution cr such 
that N(p)  = info~/pl(1 - 7r(w)) > ~. A possibilistic belief base ~= 
{(Pi °ti) : i = 1 . . . .  , m} [with the semantics N(pi)  > o~ i] is represented by 
the possibility distribution 
7r(w) = min max( /Z[pi]( to), 1 - ai), (17) 
i -1 , . . . ,m 
which extends [~{] = [Pl] n [P2] n -.. n [Pm] from a set of sentences to a 
set of weighted sentences. ~- is the least specific possibility distribution 
such that V(p a )  ~ ,  N(p)  > a, where N is computed with 1r. The 
specificity ordering is defined by 7r < 7r', which means that 7r is at least as 
informative (= specific) as W. Semantic entailment is defined in terms of 
this specificity ordering. Namely, ~ ~ (p  a )  if and only if ~r < max(/Zip ],
1 - a). This notion of semantic entailment is exactly that of Zadeh [38]. 
Note that the above framework can be equivalently expressed in terms 
of Spohnian functions. Instead of using weights in the unit interval, we can 
use integers from 0 to n, where n is the number of layers in the ordered 
belief base. An obvious understanding of a formula p being in layer i is 
that K (~p)> i, which can be made equivalent to N(p)> a, where 
i = - log2(1 - a). The most entrenched sentences are then in layer n (see 
314 Didier Dubois and Henri Prade 
for instance [34]). The minimally specific possibility distribution 7r that is 
induced by an ordered belief base is then changed into a ranking of the 
possible worlds, namely, letting f(Pi) be the layer number of Pi, 
0 if w satisfies all Pi'S in o~, 
K(o J )  = 
max/ :  oJ~ ~pi f (P i )  otherwise .  
This is called the "minimal ranking function" by Pearl [27], and it corre- 
sponds to the minimally specific possibility distribution 7r. 
Possibilistic logic is sound and complete with respect o refutation based 
on resolution [12]. Namely, it can be checked that the degree of inconsis- 
tency of a knowledge base is reflected by the extent o which the induced 
possibility distribution is subnormalized: 
inc(~)  = 1 - max 7r(o~). 
oJED. 
This property is crucial in proving the equivalence between the semantic 
and the syntactic entailments: 
07 t- (p  a ) if and only if 3;/~ (p  a) .  
When incG~() > 0, 07 is said to be partially inconsistent; when incCT) = 1, 
it is completely inconsistent. Consistent possibilistic belief bases are such 
that 7r(~o) = 1 for some o~ ~ fl. Consistency of 07 is equivalent o the 
consistency of the classical knowledge base obtained by removing the 
weights. 
When 07 is consistent, we can define an ordered belief set generated by 
as Cons(07) = {(p ~):07~- (p a)}. The set function N such that N(p) 
= a for all (p  a)  in Cons(~) (and 0 otherwise) is a necessity measure. 
The ordering >s  generated on Cons(07) is (up to some limit conditions) 
an epistemic entrenchment ordering in the sense of G[irdenfors [20] and 
an expectation ordering in the sense of G~irdenfors and Makinson [21]; see 
[151. 
Note that the restriction to 07 of the ordering on Cons(07) may fail to 
respect he original ordering on ~.  Indeed the restriction of a generated 
ordered belief set to a belief base 07 satisfies a coherence property with 
respect o necessity functions: 
For any (p a)  ~ '~ and any subset ~ = {(Pi fli ): i  = 1 . . . . .  m} of ~ ,  if 
,~' F-(pa) then it does not hold that a<min i= 1 . . . . . .  fli (N- 
coherence). 
The above condition was required by Rescher [29], who was the first to 
propose layered belief bases, in order to exploit an extended modus 
ponens rule whereby the weight of a consequence is the minimum between 
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the weights of the premises. Rott [30] calls this condition EE-coherence 
(for epistemic entrenchment). The restriction of an epistemic entrench- 
ment ordering to a belief base (or equivalently an N-coherent ordering) is 
called ensconcement by Williams [32]. Starting with any ordering on a 
belief base ~,  possibilistic inference restores the above condition on it and 
builds an ensconcement. 
When ~ is partially inconsistent, i.e., inc(J,O > 0, nontrivial deductions 
can still be made from ~,  namely, all (p a) such that o,T~ (p or), and for 
which at > inc(~). Indeed, (p at) is then the consequence of a consistent 
subpart of ~ ,  say ~*  = {(p a) : at > inc(Jq;0}. Nontrivial inference of p 
from ~ is denoted "~[-"pref P and means ~(* ~ (p a) for some positive 
a. When ~,T is partially (but not totally) inconsistent, the associated 
consistent ordered belief set is Conspref(,ff[(') : {(p or):'-~["'pref P}" In that 
case maxo,~a ~-(w) = 1 - inc(~) < 1 and Vp, min( N( p), N( ~ p)) = 
inc(~). Let -?r be a possibility distribution on II defined by 
~(to) = [ 7r(w) if ~(w)  < 1 - inc(2K), 
1 otherwise. 
Then it is easy to verify [12] that the necessity measures N and A~ based 
on rr [defined by (17)] and ~- respectively are related as follows: 
N(p) > N(~p)  ~ f l (p)  =N(p)  >N(-Tp)  =inc(Jff0 >A~(~p)  = 0. 
In fact, we have that 5r is the possibility distribution induced by ~* .  
5.2. Revising Ordered Belief Bases: Implementing the AGM Revision 
Belief change in possibilistic logic can then be envisaged as the syntactic 
implementation, on a belief base, of change operations for possibility 
distributions. Let ~ be a consistent set of possibilistic formulas. Expansion 
of J{ by p consists in forming ~ U {(p 1)}. It supplies nontrivial results 
provided that inc(~ u {(p 1)}) = 0. Clearly, the possibility distribution 7r' 
that restricts the fuzzy set of situations that satisfy ~ U {(p 1)} is ~-' = 
min(~r,/Zrpl). 
Let us consider the case when ~ is consistent, but ~ '  =~-~ u {(p 1)} is 
not, and let a = inc(~ u {(p 1)}) > 0. The following identity is easy to 
prove (e.g., [12]): 
313 > 0, ~ U {(p 1)} [--Pref (q /3) if and only if N(qlp) > O, 
where N(qlp) is the necessity measure induced from 7r(-l[p]), i.e., the 
possibility distribution expressing the contents of ~ ,  revised with respect o 
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the set of models of p. Indeed, let zr' be the possibility distribution on 1~ 
induced by ~(' ;  then 
zr' = min(~',/X[p]) , 
0 < max ~"(w) = 1 - a < 1, 
and the possibility distribution if' induced from the consistent part ~ '*  of 
~g¢" (made of sentences whose weight is higher than a)  is defined as 
(1 (o ) )  if we  [p] and ~-'(o)) < l -o~,  
-h-'(o)) = / , if o)~ [p] and ~-(o)) = 1 -  a,  
zr (o)) = 0 otherwise. 
Hence the possibility distribution induced by W{'* is i f '=  zr(.i[p]), the 
result of revising zr by [p] using the ordinal conditioning method of 
Section 3.2. 
The possibilistic revision rule based on ordinal conditioning can thus be 
expressed irectly on the belief base ~ by the following method [17], 
called the "brutal theory base operator" by Williams [32]: 
1. adding p above the top layer of ~ ,  
2. deleting all sentences whose level is below the inconsistency level 
a = incG~;" w {(p 1)}). 
Then a revised belief base ~p = (~Tu {(p 1)})* is obtained such that 
Cons(~p)  is the revision of the belief set Cons(~) by p. This belief-base 
revision is rather drastic, since all sentences  (Pi oq) with weights c~ i < a 
are thrown away and replaced by (p 1). However, it is syntax-independent. 
Note that this revision method works even if the weights attached to 
formulae are not N-coherent. Suppose (q/3)  ~,~ and ~ ' t -  (qy) with 
y > /3. This means that (q/3)  can be deleted from ~¢" without altering its 
fuzzy set of models. The revision being syntax-independent, the presence 
or the absence o f (q /3 )  in ~" will not affect the fuzzy set of models of J~ , .  
Note that when I I (p)  > 0, N(qlp) > 0 is equivalent o N(-~ p v q) > 
N(~ p v ~ q), i.e., in terms of epistemic entrenchment [20], ~ p v q is 
more entrenched than ~ p v -7 q, and corresponds to a characteristic 
condition, in [20], for having q in the (ordered) belief set obtained by 
revising Cons(~') with respect o p. We just showed that this revision is 
easily implemented in the possibilistic belief base itself, without making 
the underlying ordered belief set explicit. This result goes against he often 
encountered claim that working with epistemic entrenchment orderings 
would be intractable. Note that the revision produces a new epistemic 
entrenchment ordering that is in accordance with the min-based condition- 
ing, but not the natural revision. 
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5.3. Parsimonious Revisions of Ordered Belief Bases 
A more parsimonious revision scheme for possibilistic belief bases 
receiving an input p is to consider all subsets of ~ that fail to infer 
(~ p a) for a > 0. If Jg" is such a subset, then the result of the revision 
could be ~Te'U {(p 1)}. We may take advantage of the ordering in 35( to 
make the selection. Namely, we may restrict ourselves to ~ such that 
V(q a)  ~ Y,Y.C'U {(q a),(p 1)} ~ (± a)  in the possibilistic logic sense, i.e., 
(q a) is involved in the contradiction. This proposal, made independently 
in [11], corresponds to selecting a preferred subbase in the sense of 
Brewka [7]. This selection process leads to a unique solution if ~ is totally 
ordered. In case of ties, further refinement can be made using a lexico- 
graphic ordering of the weights of the sentences not in ~,  as proposed in 
[11]. These revision processes, which also relate to Nebel's [26] syntax-based 
revision schemes, are systematically studied in [2, 3]. 
This kind of revision process cannot be expressed at the semantic level, 
where all sentences in the knowledge base ~ u {(p 1)} have been com- 
bined into a possibility distribution on l-l, and revision is performed on the 
aggregated possibility distribution. In particular, if (q/3) ~ ~ and /3 < 
inc(~(U {(p 1)}) then min(~-, p,[p]) _< max(/Xtq], 1 -- /3), i.e., everything 
happens as if (q/3 ) had never been in ~.  The alternative syntactic revision 
rule, explained above, breaks the minimal inconsistent subsets of ~ U 
{(p 1)} in a parsimonious way, enabling pieces of evidence like (q/3) to be 
spared when they are not involved in the inconsistency of ~ u {(p 1)}. 
EXAMPLE Consider the belief base ~= {(~po~),(q/3)} with /3 < c~. 
Then 
~-(to) = min(max(1 - /Xtpl(to), 1 - a ), max( ~Eql( to), 1 -/3)) 
1 if w~ ~p Aq, 
= 1-  a if to .p ,  
1 /3 if to~ -~pA ~q.  
Revising by input p at the semantic level leads us to consider 
1 -  a if to .p ,  
It'(to) = min(1r(to),/X[vl(to) ) = 0 otherwise. 
Hence ~-(tol[p])= 1 if to ~p and 0 otherwise. Hence ~p = {(pl)}. 
Acting at the syntactic level, the preferred subbase of {(p 1), (~ p a), (q/3 )} 
that contains p is {(pl),(q/3)}. Note that although min(~-,/X[p])< 
max(/Xlql, 1 - /3 ) ,  we no longer have Ir(tol[p]) < min(~rql(to), 1 - /3 ) ,  
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i.e., adding the low-certainty formulae consistent with ~*  leads to a 
nontrivial expansion of ~-(.[ p]). This points out a weakness of the 
semantic views of revision, which is particularly true with numerical 
approaches: the representation of the cognitive state is lumped, i.e., the 
pieces of belief are no longer available and the semantic revision process 
cannot account for the structure of the cognitive state that is made explicit 
in the ordered belief base. 
5.4. Adjustments of Ordered Belief Bases 
Possibilistic base revision can be extended to the case of uncertain 
inputs. This has been done by Williams [34] for her so-called adjustments. 
We have pointed out that if the input information is of the form (p a), an 
adjustment is the possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey's rule as given by 
Equation (11) and * = min when the weight is positive. Williams [34] gives 
a rather complex recipe to achieve the adjustment on the belief base itself. 
Stated in terms of necessity measures, the adjustment comes down to 
computing, for all formulas q, the degree (see Lemma 1) 
N(q l (p  a) )  = min(N(q lp ) ,  max(a, N(q[~ p)) ) .  
Let us use this equation in proposing a method for adjusting possibilistic 
knowledge bases. Let ~ = {(Pi a i ) : i  = 1 . . . . .  n} be a possibilistic knowl- 
edge base, and consider an input information of the form N' (p )  = a. An 
adjustment algorithm can proceed as follows in order to compute the 
adjusted knowledge base o7 ~ p"  
ADJUSTMENT OF,~ BY N'(p) = a 
1. Compute oTp and O7" p using the above brutal syntactic revision 
method. 
2. The adjusted belief base O7~ is then defined by {(q/3): q ~oTp u 
oT*p, f l  = min( /3+, max( /3 -, a))}, where /3 + is the weight of q in 
* and /3- the weight of q in ~ p, with the understanding that .~g(p 
the weight of a formula is 0 when it does not appear in the corre- 
sponding knowledge base. 
oz Let us check that indeed oTp F- (p a)  and is consistent. Several cases 
must be considered: 
(a) j'z, fU  {(pl)} and ~U {(~pl )}  are consistent. Then oTp =~U 
{(p 1)}, and ~*  =32/U{(~p l )} .Hence(pa)~oTp,  buts inceo7 ~p 
does not contain -~ p at any nonzero level, ~ p does not appear in 
~p either. If Pi appears in ~,  it appears in both .g/_ and O7 p, 
and so the weight /3i of Pi in oTp is /3 = min(ai, max"a, ai)) =a i -  
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Moreover, ~ t- (p, a )  does not hold, since ~" is consistent with 
(-1 p 1). Then we have ~"p =~U {(p a)} and ~ ~- (p O/). 
(b) o7(~- (p /3)  for O/< ft. In that case ~{p =J~5(w ((p 1)} and inc(oT( 
u {( -~ p 1)}) =/3,  so ~( ~ p = T(~, /3 )  U {( -7 p 1)}, where T (~, /3 )  
is the result of truncating 35( by deletion of formulas whose weight 
is at most /3. Then .Y/'p = {(p O/)} w {(Pi ai): ai > /3 or O/i -< a} u 
{(Pi a ) :  a < a i < fl}, where the formulas (Pi O/i) with O/< O/i ~ /3 
g~ 
are discounted to level (Pi O/). Indeed, if Pi appears in oT(p and 
.7,(* (because O/i > /3), then again O/i obtains. If Pi does not ~p 
appear in J~'* ~p, then its weight in ~ 'p  is min(o/i O/). Clearly, 
oT((p, ~) ~- (p O/), since all formulas of weight /3 that are instrumen- 
tal in proving p from .7,( now have weight O/, and all formulas of 
weight y ~ (o/,/3) that could be used to prove p have weight O/ as 
well. Note that even formulas Pi not involved in proving p get 
weight O/ if O/< O/i < /3, which indicates the brutal behavior of this 
method. 
(c) 5~- (p /3 )  for O/>_/3. This case is similar to the previous one 
from a formal point of view, but is in fact of the same nature as (a), 
since the input corresponds to a reinforcement of the certainty of p. 
ct  It is easy to check that .Tgp =~'U {(p O/)} is a valid way of adjust- 
t% ing ~(p. If (p /3)  is already explicitly in ~,  then one may delete it of 
course. 
:g 
(d) ~ (~p/3) .  Then, since ~p = T(~, /3 )  U {(pl)}, we have 
E ot I (Pi O/i) ~p  for O/i > /3" But since (Pi O/i) ~ ,~p when O/i </3, we 
have 3¢'p = {(p O/)} u T(~,/3) .  The syntactic hange is then drastic 
again. 
Two comments may shed some light on the interest of the above 
method. First, natural revision is easy to capture under the form of an 
input of the form N(p)  > O/ where 0 < O/< min{o/i : (p O/i) ~}.  The 
procedure for natural revision is as for adjustment in cases (a) and (d). 
Case (c) never occurs. In case (b), natural revision just does not affect ~.  
Next, the type of adjustment carried out in cases (b) and (d) is very drastic, 
as explained above. If a more parsimonious adjustment must be achieved 
in case (b), it means that all minimal subsets of ~ that imply p with a level 
higher than O/ must be computed. Let 5 ~ be such a minimal subset and 
SP~ (p y)  with /3 > y > O/. Then for every such S p, some (Pi Y) ~ must 
be turned into (Pi O/), but other formulas in S ~' may remain as they were. 
Clearly the computational task is then heavier than with the brutal 
syntactic adjustment, which in terms requires only that two satisfiability 
tests be carried out at most. The same remark applies to case (d), where 
T (~, /3 )  can be changed into another more parsimoniously revised ~ as 
mentioned in Section 5.3. This type of parsimonious belief adjustment has 
been recently proposed by Williams [35]. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Possibility theory can capture many forms of belief change encountered 
in the recent literature, while keeping the connection with probabilistic 
forms of belief change. Some results pertaining to the revision of syntactic 
belief bases completely ordered in terms of necessity degrees have been 
provided. They should be considered in the framework of more general 
tools for merging belief bases, including symmetric ombination methods 
for several belief bases issued from distinct sources, as recently studied by 
Benferhat et al. [4]. 
APPENDIX. MAPPING ADJUSTMENT OF KAPPA FUNCTIONS TO 
THE POSSIBILISTIC SETTING 
An adjustment of K by (A ,n )  is either a contraction K A if n = 0 or 




KA(Og) = (0 
~(o9) 
K(A,.~(Og) = 
if n = 0, 
if 0 <n < K(A), 
otherwise, 
1 if 
~'~A a)(og) = 7r(o9) if 
' 7r (o9) if 
1 - -  a if 
if o9 ~X and K(og) = K(A) ,  
otherwise, 
! if togA and K(og) = K(A), 
(to) if eitherw ~A and ~(o9) # K(A) 
oro9 ~A and K(og) > n, 
otherwise. 
It is obvious that KA(O9) becomes 7rA(w), using the mapping 7r(o9)= 
2 -'~(n), and considering the definition of a contraction in the possibilistic 
setting. Hence Williams's contraction exactly corresponds to possibilistic 
contraction. Let us consider K × The corresponding possibilistic rule is ( A,n'f  
(noticing ~ = 1 - 2-")  
o9 ~A and ~-(o9) = I I (A) ,  
o9 ~A and ~r(w) < I I (A) ,  
w ~_A and 7r(w) < 1 - ~, 
w ~Xand 7r(o9) > 1 - o~. 
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This definition can then be simplified: 
7r × [ 7r(tolA) if to E A,  
(A,,~)(to) = [min(1  - o~,Tr(to)) if to CA .  
This is the belief change operation (15) with * = min: this operat ion has 
been given a clear meaning in Section 3.2, since (A,  n) is thus an unsure 
input that can be rejected if too uncertain. The adjustment hen can be 
expressed as follows in the possibilistic setting: 
7r~*A, ~) I 
~'A if c~ = 0, 
_ × 
= (~A) (A , . )  i f  0 < O~ <N(A) ,  
7/ -× t (A, n) otherwise. 
Assume N(A) > a > 0. Then 
(TrA)(A,.)(to) = [ ~'~(tolA) if to cA  
t min(1 - a ,~ 'A( to ) )  if togA.  
It is not difficult to check that: 
1. 7rA (tolA) = 7r(wlA). Indeed, if to CA ,  then both sides are zero. If 
to ~ A, then ~'A(to) = 7r(to) everywhere. 
2. If to CA  then ~'A ( to )= max(Tr(to), ~r(tolA-))= 7r(tolA). 
Hence 
~-* , ) ( to )= /~- ( to lA)  if to~A,  
(A, t min(1 -- a ,  ~-(tolA)) otherwise. 
× But since Assume now N(A)  < or; then, as stated above, Try*A,,) = 'W(A,a  ). 
N(A) < oe, we have II(tT) > 1 - a,  so when to ~ A, 
if 7r(w) < 1 - c~ then 7r(tolA) = 7r(to), 
if 7r(to)_> 1 -  ce then 7r(tolA) > 1 - ce; 
hence min(1 -  a,  Tr(to))= min(1 -  a,  7r(toltT)) for w CA.  It becomes 
clear that 7r~*A, ~) takes the same form whether N(A) > a or not and 
coincides with the counterpart of Jeffrey's rule in the possibilistic setting, 
that is, the rule (11) with * = min. 
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